Previous Defence debates have raged between notions of 'forward defence' versus 'continental defence'. The flaw in these models was that both were predicated fairly specifically upon defence of Australia rather than expanding to incorporate defence of people or environment - in short, to incorporate more fully the ideas of human security and global security. Both of these trends are on the rise following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the 1995 Human Development Report that defined human security and addressed such issues in more detail than had been accomplished previously.

Only recently has the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan argued that even the United Nations had to reevaluate its approach to the concept of sovereignty focused solely on nation states.

"State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined - not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty - by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties - has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect human beings, not to protect those who abuse them."

The current military thinking that defence is about the role of force in international affairs is therefore under increasing strain. This is being called into question because the number and frequency of high-intensity conflicts are diminishing whereas lower levels of conflict are becoming more prevalent. So for a military to be equipped, trained and readied for deployment in high-intensity operations is not only enormously expensive, it is also increasingly unlikely. UNAA would suggest that the risk management approach to the prospects for high-intensity versus low-intensity operations by the ADF requires review.

The Defence White Paper consultation process only examines traditional concepts of security. For Defence planning, where forward timeframes of 20 to 30 years must be incorporated into planning, the trend is for an increasing focus on human security and global security to rise and the number of low-level conflicts to increase. The potential for high-intensity conflicts such as in Korea or Taiwan remains as they have for some decades. The increases have instead come about in the potential for damage through terrorism by 'rogue states' and in horizontal proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) into our region. Neither of these two concerns are readily dealt with by increasing conventional armaments.

So where does this leave the theory of defence in the Australian community? We want our families to be safe and our environment to be sustainable. Do we want to finance equipment and training for high intensity conflicts in Northeast Asia or to safeguard first ourselves and then our neighbours? The latter is more likely. So how does this impact upon the practical aspects - the tasks and roles the Australia community needs from our Defence personnel, equipment and resources?

Role of the ADF
The roles and tasks for our defence forces should logically flow from what the Australian community needs. This is the safety of our families both in a physical and environmental sense. The defence forces can assist this by deterring threats to Australian citizens and international allies directly and to the depletion or destruction of our environment and its assets, ie fishing stocks. Anything else is additional - a want and not a need.

To ensure the safety of our families, hostile action by states, terrorists and controllers of WMD should be the highest priority now and in future. To safeguard our environment, maritime policing and enforcement is a high priority. Additionally, our positive relationship with neighbouring communities and states will further assist both of these aims, extending out to the global sphere.

The difference is whether Australians want our defence forces to take on a peacekeeping and regulating role or a more coercive, enforcement role in their activities. Domestically, the military supports humanitarian action in cases of state or national emergency relief. This is occurring more often in our nearer region also, for example, the supportive role in Papua New Guinea after the tidal monsoon devastated village communities or when the ADF provided drought relief. This is compared to the more coercive peace-enforcing role taken in East Timor.

To choose between these two is difficult. The current military thinking is that by equipping and training for the high-threat and coercive, enforcing roles then it is easier to adjust downwards for a humanitarian role, rather than move upwards to respond to a higher threat. In terms of quantity, the humanitarian tasks far outweigh the number of coercive, interventionist tasks. The risks associated with not responding to high threat situations is considered sufficient at present to warrant retaining the equipment and training to cope with these events. This has had significant implications for what types of equipment the Defence Department has purchased up until now, but should be clearly reevaluated in terms of the changed regional environment for any future acquisitions.

Equipment
Drawing on the Capability Fact Book issued along with the Defence Review 2000 document, military equipment falls into two broad categories. The first is equipment designed specifically for addressing a high threat scenario, and the second, equipment that can be utilised for both high and low threat situations. The following table is included to promote discussion of these two types of equipment.

Defence would no doubt like to maintain capabilities for both low and high level threats, but it is possible to prioritise equipment acquisitions that can be used for both categories, rather than exclusively high threat ones.

UNAA therefore supports a Defence Force Structure that places priority on the acquisition of equipment that has a dual-use facility for both high and low threat scenarios, ie. for both the Defence of Australia and peacekeeping/humanitarian activities.

Further exploration on the relationship between personnel levels and which platforms and capabilities to acquire would be useful before any decision was made. Obviously personnel issues would flow from the overall equipment decisions that are made, but the implications for what this means for Personnel does not seem to have been adequately explored, for example, the role, skills and deployment of defence force personnel requires review following the choice of policy path.

The difficulty with a focus on high technology items is that to remain competitive they require constant upgrading. This requires higher levels of spending and more regular technical changes with higher associated costs such as operator training. If the priority is, as we suggest, on lower technology items, they would not need to be upgraded as often.

Enduring, low-threat assets ensure a greater focus on human security and the environment and are better able to cater for humanitarian and peacekeeping roles overseas. Only if resources permit should funding for high-threat items be considered.

Training
As part of a greater commitment to Defence staff a stronger focus on training for peacekeeping operations should also be considered.

There are a number of initiatives that could be taken to strengthen the ADF's role in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. Enhanced specialised peacekeeping training for the ADF both before and after a mission would be valuable, including language, cultural awareness and conflict resolution training.

This could be in addition to integrated peacekeeping training for both the full time and reserve components of the ADF. An increase in field training and officer-level game exercises to expand the working knowledge of peace-operation scenarios should also be considered, and should include components on inter-operability issues and working within an international coalition (whether UN or other). Perhaps international-training exercises would also be warranted.

It would also be useful to strengthen the 'lessons learned' aspect of military doctrine relating to peacekeeping, humanitarian and emergency relief operations. Although these may not be the primary role of the ADF, as the incidence of involvement in these activity increases, so does the need to maximise the benefit of experience and innovation .

Draft UNAA Recommendations to the Defence White Paper Consultation Process
The United Nations Association of Australia (UNAA) therefore recommends:

• That UNAA commends the consultation process adopted for this review and requests that public involvement in Defence funding priorities continue in the future. UNAA also requests that an ongoing community consultation unit be established within Defence after the Defence White Paper consultation process has concluded. This could also focus on educational and awareness raising activities throughout Australia, perhaps in partnership between the ADF and UNAA, and could include opportunities to involve young people in considering broader strategic issues of defence and security.
  
  
• That the concept of defence be broadened to incorporate issues of human, environmental and global security. This should also provide for a greater commitment to funding a range of strategic policy centres, including those relating to peace and the United Nations.
  
  
• That the strategic priorities for Defence focus more on low threat plus counter-terrorist and WMD issues, than on high threat scenarios. A stronger focus on preparing for preventative diplomacy operations should also be considered. UNAA also requests that Defence's Force Structure place priority on the acquisition of equipment that has a dual-use facility for both high and low threat scenarios, ie. for both the Defence of Australia and peacekeeping/humanitarian activities.
  
  
• That the Defence Department, in conjunction with other Government Agencies, strengthen Australia's involvement in international security regimes to work towards greater arms control in the areas of nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons. UNAA also expresses its opposition to any Australian involvement in the National Missile System. UNAA also recommends that regional security issues should be conducted through a more coordinated 'whole-of-government' approach, ie. using preventative diplomacy, confidence building, development assistance, diplomatic and military relationships, etc, in a holistic and consistent government framework. This may require upgrading all international engagement elements as part of an overall plan.
  
  
• That the Defence Department, in conjunction with other Government Agencies, strengthen Australia's involvement in the United Nations and other multilateral institutions to contribute through peace-building and conflict resolution to regional and global security.
  
  
• That a comprehensive evaluation of Defence's personnel structure requirements be conducted in conjunction with any decision on which platforms/capabilities should be pursued.
  
  
• That a greater priority be given to ADF training in peacekeeping.